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INTRODUCTION

Crime victims' interests in both justice and minimizing secondary victimization are increasingly relevant to modern judicially formulated procedures. The increasing relevance of victims' interests has important im+ Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School and Director, National Crime Victim Law Institute. This article is dedicated to the late Judge William Keys, mentor and
best friend. May you live large in the hereafter.
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plications for crafting judicial procedures that routinely capture these
interests, judicial interpretation of historic citizens' participation rights,
striking the proper balance between the formal parties' and victims' interests, and revisiting outmoded procedures crafted judicially without
regard for victims' interests.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I includes a brief overview of
historic citizen participation, including the changeover from private to
public prosecution. Victims' interests were prominent in the era of private prosecution, diminished during the rise of public prosecution, and
are increasingly relevant in a time of victims' rights. Also in this section,
three kinds of discretion are identified as relevant. First is the public
prosecutorial discretion never ceded to citizen prosecutors; second, the
discretion originally ceded to citizen private prosecutors, now exercised
by the state; third, the discretion originally ceded to citizens and still retained by them. Part I then focuses upon two United States Supreme
Court cases, Linda R.S. v. Richard Dand Leeke v. Timmerman,2 decided
at the nadir of victim participation, to examine relevant types of prosecutorial discretion. Linda R.S. provides an example of the Court's refusal
to extend citizen participation rights into areas of historic government
discretion that were not ceded to private prosecutors.
In contrast,
Timmerman evidences the responsiveness of courts to changes in the legal culture. In particular, in an era of public prosecution, Timmerman
was influenced by the reality of public prosecution, using it to limit a state
citizen's independent participation right.4
Part II is an overview of modern victims' rights. Rights of participation, privacy, and protection founmiu& in victims' interests mark a significant change in criminal process culture. Broad and specific rights are
examined. These rights demonstrate a vigorous trend towards the inclusion of victims' interests within the criminal process. Victims' rights
themselves are important bases for judicially formulated procedures, but
it is also the interests underlying the rights that define the scope of the
rights. Moreover, victims' interests have been relied upon as relevant in
formulating judicially crafted procedure, even where the scope of broad
or specific rights does not encompass the issue.
Part III is divided into five sections, each analyzing distinct contexts in
which victims' rights and interests have been relevant to judicially crafted
procedure. The increasing relevance of victims' interests in judicial deci1. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
2. 454 U.S. 83 (1981) (per curiam).
3. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619.
4. Timmerman, 454 U.S. at 87. Whatever "judicial activism" means, it is an excessive
label for judicial facilitation of a legislatively driven broad change in the le: al culture. The
legislatively driven broad changes in culture examined here are the rise Gf public prosecution and the rise of crime victims' rights and interests.
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sions in this era of victims' rights is demonstrated. The recognition of
victims' interests in recent Supreme Court opinions is examined in Part
III, section A. The Supreme Court on several occasions has identified
victims' interests as important considerations in the administration of
justice. Section B sets out a judicially crafted procedure designed to routinely capture victims' interests. The example is a judicially created procedure to ensure input to the court about the victims' views concerning
government motions to dismiss indictments. In Section C, victims' interests are reviewed as rationales for ending abatement ab initio. Here the
clear trend is to end the doctrine of abatement ab initio because of victims' interests; or victims' rights to fairness, dignity and respect; or the
victims' right to restitution. Section D investigates a modern Wisconsin
case that reviews an historic procedure allowing victims' judicial access to
charging. That case upholds the historic procedure against a constitutional challenge and, in the concurring opinions, identifies modern victims' rights and the victims' interests underlying those rights as relevant
to the ongoing viability of the historic procedure Finally, section E analyzes victims' positions on impaneling a foreign jury versus change of
venue. In particular, the New Jersey Supreme Court, despite the absence
of a victims' right expressly addressing venue, relied upon victims' more
general rights and interests to affirm the trial court's alternate decision to
6
impanel a foreign jury. Just as the legislated change towards public
prosecution informed judicial decisions that conformed to that evolving
legal culture, so too is the legislated rise of victims' interests transforming
the legal culture and informing judicially crafted procedure. Courts now
weigh victims' interests in both justice and minimizing secondary victimization when making procedural choices in individual cases, even where
no specific victims' right applies.
In Section IV, the Article revisits the Timmerman opinion, arguing
that, in an era of victims' rights and interests, the Timmerman opinion's
analytical approach does not adequately weigh victims' interests in the
balance because victims' interests, as well as victims' rights, are now relevant considerations in judicially crafted procedures.
The Article concludes that, as the legislatively led historic shift to public prosecution was facilitated by courts, so too, the legislatively led modern shift to victims' rights has moved the courts' to acknowledge victims'
interests when weighing judicial procedural choices. Finally, the Article
urges that procedures should also be formulated to ensure the routine
judicial consideration of both victims' interests and the views of the victim.

5.
6.

See generally State v. Unnamed Defendant, 441 N.W.2d 696 (Wis. 1989).
See generally State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55 (N.J. 1999).
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I. THE RISE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTION AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS
INVOLVING CITIZENS' INTERESTS

A. Citizens' HistoricallyBased ParticipationRights and Government's
Ceded and Unceded Discretion
Citizens' participation rights initially existed in an era of private prosecution. In early America, private prosecutions were dominant.7 The system of private prosecution had been "preferred because it avoided the
tyranny of government prosecutors and the expense of providing for public prosecution."8 A recent overview of the shift from private prosecution
to public prosecution reveals that private prosecution survived in the
United States well into the 1800s, 9 and in petty offenses continues as a
viable procedure to this day.'0 In private prosecutions, citizens bring
charges and hire counsel to prosecute crimes themselves. As Professor
McDonald recounts: "Even after identification and arrest, the victim carried the burden of prosecution. He retained an attorney and paid to have
the indictment written and the offender prosecuted."11 Other legal historians report that private prosecution was dominant. 2 "Professor Nelson's
history of a typical Massachusetts county between 1760 and 1810 ....
reports that criminal trials were 'in reality a contest between subjects
rather that contests between government and subjects.""..3 Other historians acknowledge the pre- and post-colonial prevalence of private prosecution.14 In sum, discretion in day-to-day litigation was ceded to private
prosecutors.
However, some state discretion was never ceded to private prosecutors.
Even after cases met probable cause standards, the state's nolle prosequi
(dismissal) authority allowed the state to terminate private prosecutions,
even over the objection of the private prosecutor. 5 Another unceded
discretion was the state's authority to bring, or decline to bring, cases
independently of private prosecutors.16 Citizens could not compel the
7. Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, The Crime Victim's Right to Attend the Trial:
The ReascendantNationalConsensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481, 484-88 (2005).
8. Id. at 485.
9. Id. at 484, 486; see also Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of "Public"
Prosecutorsin HistoricalPerspective, 39 AM. CRIM L. REV. 1309, 1391 (2002).
10. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
11. William F. McDonald, Towards a BicentennialRevolution in CriminalJustice: The
Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 652 (1976).
12. Beloof & Cassell, supra note 7, at 485 (citing legal historians).
13. Id. (quoting William E. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modem Criminal Law in the
Revolutionary Era:An HistoricalPerspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 468 (1967)) (footnote
omitted).
14. Id. (citing legal historians).
15. See 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 61 (15th ed. 1993).
16. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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state to take action to prosecute or not
prosecute one another. 7 Instead,
8
court.
in
redress
direct
sought
citizens
Public prosecutors gradually took over from private prosecutors.19
Public prosecution's rise has been linked to the abandonment of cases
brought by private prosecutors.2 0 As public prosecution replaced private
prosecution, the state took over day-to-day litigation discretion from private prosecutors. In some contexts, most notably felony trials, citizens'
historic participation rights were eliminated .21
The end of the era of private prosecution left a variety of enduring citizen participation rights which vary among jurisdictions. These rights exist in various procedural contexts. In the investigation phase, citizens can
conduct a private investigation.2 Citizens can request grand jury23 and
judicial investigations." In some contexts, citizens can finance public investigations. 5 Citizens can arrest without a warrant for felonies, breaches
of the peace, and in some jurisdictions, misdemeanors committed in the
citizen's presence.2 Concerning the charging process, citizens can access

17. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
18. Supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text. See generally, PETER CHARLES
HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 112-21 (rev. ed. 1998).
19. See Beloof & Cassell, supra note 7, at 487 (citing authorities).
20. Id.
21. The end of felony private prosecution has been thorough enough that two federal
circuits have suggested that felony private prosecutions might violate evolving standards of
defendants' due process. See East v. Scott, 55 F.3d 996, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1995); Person v.
Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 663-64 (4th Cir. 1988).
22. See State v. Clause von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1012 (R.I. 1984).
23. DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 335-71 (2d ed. 2006) (reviewing cases regarding citizen access to
grand jury); see also Peter L. Davis, Rodney King and the Decriminalizationof Police Brutality in America: Direct and JudicialAccess to the Grand Jury as Remedies for Victims of
Police Brutality When the ProsecutorDeclines to Prosecute, 53 MD. L. REV. 263, 271, 30852 (1994).
24. See State v. Unnamed Defendant, 441 N.W.2d 696, 697 (Wis. 1989). The Wisconsin statute provides in pertinent part:
If a person complains to a judge that he or she has reason to believe that a crime has
been committed... the judge shall examine the complainant under oath and any witnesses produced by him or her .... The extent to which the judge may proceed in the
examination is within the judge's discretion.... If it appears probable from the testimony given that a crime has been committed ...the complaint may be reduced to
writing.., and thereupon a warrant shall issue for the arrest of the accused.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.26 (West 2007).
25. See People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 321 (Cal. 1996); Jim Redden, Hired Gun.
Neighborhood Crime Got You Down? Buy Yourself a Prosecutor, WILLAME'ITE WEEK,
Dec. 13, 1990, reprinted in BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 23, at 239-40.
26. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 57 (1995).
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grand juries2 7 and seek judicial charging.8 In the case of misdemeanors,
subject to the public prosecutors' authority to nolle prosequi, victims can
initiate judicial charging and privately prosecute the case. 29 Citizens can
obtain assistance of counsel at their own expense to defend their historic
rights.3 ° Moreover, citizen participation rights are judicially cognizable,
as citizens can seek review of, and remedy for, rights violations.
Emerging from the era of private prosecution are three categories of
public prosecutorial discretion relevant to citizens' historic participation
rights: first, the public prosecutorial discretion never ceded to citizens,
including dismissal authority and discretion of the public prosecutor to3 2
bring or not bring a prosecution independently of private prosecutions;
second, the discretion originally ceded to citizens as private prosecutors
since relocated to the state, such as public prosecution in the felony trial
stage; 33 and third, the discretion originally ceded to citizens and still4 retained by them-the historic and enduring citizen participation rights.
While some historic citizen participation rights endured, the ultimate
status of these rights remained uncertain. How would courts treat enduring citizen participation rights now contextualized by the trend toward
public prosecutorial exclusivity? The answer is explored in two significant United States Supreme Court cases.
B. Supreme Court Opinions at the Nadir of Citizen Victims' Rights
Two relevant Supreme Court opinions were issued during the period
between the decline of private prosecution and the rise of modem state
victims' rights. In the first opinion, Linda R.S. v. Richard D., the Court
effectively held that citizens do not have rights in state criminal processes
that did not exist at common law.3 5 The Linda R.S. opinion is a fairly
27. Supra note 23.
2& See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Benz, 565 A.2d 764, 766-67 (Pa. 1989); Unnamed
Defendant, 441 N.W.2d at 697.
29. E.g., New Jersey v. Kinder, 701 F. Supp. 486, 487, 491 (D. N.J. 1988) (allowing
private prosecution in simple assault case); Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866,
869,871 (R.I. 2001) (allowing private prosecution in domestic violence case).
30. E.g., State ex. rel Beach v. Norblad, 781 P.2d 349, 349-50 (Or. 1989) (issuing peremptory writ after challenge by victims' lawyer to lower court's jurisdiction to order defense entrance into victim's home; writ issued); State ex rel. Miller v. Smith, 285 S.E.2d 500,
501 (W. Va. 1981) (issuing the victim's attorney a writ of prohibition forbidding the prosecutor's interference with victim's access to grand jury).
31. See Norblad,781 P.2d at 350; Smith, 285 S.E.2d at 502.
32. TORCIA, supra note 15, § 61.
33. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
34. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
35. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Linda R.S. is best known
for introducing the redressability requirement to the federal standing doctrine. See id. at
618. This redressability issue is distinct from the subject of this Article. Here, the opinions
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straightforward application of unceded government discretion, albeit in
the then novel context of an equal protection claim.
The second Supreme Court opinion examined here is Leeke v.
Timmerman, in which the Court determined that a South Carolina citizen
did not have a right to obtain an arrest warrant independent of the public
prosecutor's
review. 36 Timmerman gives heavy weight to public prosecu17
tion, weight which is only justifiable in the historic context of
Timmerman, issued during the apex of exclusive public prosecutorial authority.
1. Linda R.S.
Linda R.S. v. Richard D. provides an example of public prosecutorial
discretion historically never ceded to citizens. In Linda R.S., the mother
of an illegitimate child alleged an equal protection violation and sought
to compel a Texas county prosecutor to bring charges of criminal nonsupport after the prosecutor declined to do so because, "in his view," the
statute did not extend to children born out of wedlock. 8 Holding that
Linda R.S. had no standing to use a mandamus action to compel a prosecutor to charge,39 the Court stated that "in American jurisprudence at
least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another." 4°
Although the Linda R.S. opinion is silent on the procedural point, its
holding is consistent with traditional state mandamus limitations-that
mandamus could not be used to compel a discretionary act of the public
prosecutor.4' Even in the era of private prosecution, public prosecutors
had discretion to direct, or not direct, state resources to prosecution.
are examined to explore whether public prosecutorial discretion exists in a given procedural context.
36. See Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 87 (1981) (per curiam).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 70-74.
3& See Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 614-16.
39. Id. at 616, 619.
40. Id. at 619.
41. E.g., Ackerman v. Houston, 43 P.2d 194, 195 (Ariz. 1935) (stating that mandamus
will not lie to compel a prosecutor to lay complaint before a magistrate); Asherman v.

Bales, 78 Cal. Rptr. 445, 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) ("[A] court cannot control this [public
prosecutor's] discretionary [charging] power by mandamus."); Leone v. Farelli, 87
N.Y.S.2d 850, 851 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949) ("[TJhe general duty to prosecute all crimes...
may not be required or supervised."). Cases after Linda R.S. are to the same effect. State
ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Minn. 1977) ("[T]he decision whether to initiate
a particular prosecution is discretionary and therefore normally beyond the scope of mandamus."); Kerpan v. Sandoval County Dist. Attorney's Office (In re Grand Jury Sandoval
County), 750 P.2d 464, 468 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that "mandamus does not lie to
require a prosecutor to present specific evidence before a grand jury"). But see, State ex
rel. Hamstead v. Dostert, 313 S.E.2d 409, 415-16 (W. Va. 1984) (holding that mandamus
may be used to compel a prosecutor to act upon probable cause).
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Citizens' common law private prosecution rights did not allow citizens to
seek a writ of mandamus requiring a public prosecutor to exercise prosecutorial charging discretion.42
Instead of compelling the public prosecutor to charge, citizens brought
charges independently of the public prosecutor. For example, in the
Maryland case of Brack v. Wells, decided three decades before Linda
R.S., the state's high court ruled that mandamus could not be used to
compel a public prosecutor to charge:
As a general rule, whether the State's Attorney does or does not
institute a particular prosecution is a matter which rests in his discretion. Unless that discretion is grossly abused or such duty
compelled by statute or there is a clear showing that such duty exists mandamus will not lie.43
Further, the Brack court stated that mandamus would not lie when
there was another remedy available. 44 That other remedy was for the
citizen to independently approach the grand jury.45
Unquestionably, Linda R.S., as a Texan, could have directly approached a Texas grand jury in an attempt to secure a charge. Written
before Linda R.S., the seminal Texas case of Hott v. Yarbrough opined:
"Equally clear is the right of any one who may consider himself aggrieved
by the actual or supposed commission of a crime to call the matter to the
attention of the grand jury for investigation and action." 46 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Texas case law after Linda R.S., confirmed that Texas citizens had a common law right of direct access to the
grand jury: "Under Texas law, the grand jury has the authority to conduct
their own investigations, to subpoena evidence and witnesses,. . . and to
indict on matters as to which the district attorney has presented no evidence and sought no indictment., 47 The Linda R.S. case did not alter
Linda R.S.'s personal right to independently approach the Texas grand
jury. Nor did it alter the fact that her right to seek grand jury charging
was judicially cognizable. Instead, Linda R.S. involved a procedurally
inappropriate challenge to public prosecutorial discretion because she
sought to compel the public prosecutor to bring charges, an approach that
failed her as it had failed the Maryland victim in Brack and victims in
other jurisdictions. 48 It failed her because citizen actions to compel public
42. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
43. Black v. Wells, 46 A.2d 319, 321 (Md. 1944).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 321-22.
46. Hott v. Yarbrough, 245 S.W. 676, 678-79 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922).
47. Smith v. Hightower, 693 F.2d 359, 368 n.21 (5th Cir. 1982).
48. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Unfortunately, the closest the
Linda R.S. opinion comes to making this clear is to say that "in American jurisprudence
...a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecu-
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prosecutors invaded the unceded discretion of the government not to
initiate charging procedures.49
The Linda R.S. case is limited to procedural contexts where state public
prosecutors already exercise lawful discretion. Put another way, Linda
R.S. means "that, in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution
of another" 0 in procedures where public prosecutorial discretion already
exists.
The cases cited in Linda R.S. also support the idea that government
discretion must already exist before citizens can be said to have "no judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another., 51 The Younger v. Harris Court held that no standing existed for
persons to join with the criminal defendant as interveners in a civil injunction to halt prosecution when those persons were neither prosecuted
52
nor threatened with prosecution. In Bailey v. Patterson,the Court held
that plaintiffs had no standing to enjoin prosecution where there was no
allegation that plaintiffs were being prosecuted or threatened with prosecution. In both Younger and Bailey, the uncharged citizen had no standing to challenge the public prosecutor's exercise of already existing lawful
discretion to bring charges. Finally, in Poe v. Ullman, plaintiffs were denied standing to bring a civil declaratory judgment action to invalidate
tion of another." Id. Perhaps, because federal procedure governs federal claims arising
out of state law, the Court felt constrained to develop its own federal case law without
reference to prior state court opinions ruling that mandamus could not be used to compel
the public prosecutor to initiate charging.
49. I have changed my view of Linda R.S., which had been that the rise of public
prosecution may have "meant the end of judicially cognizable victim interests in charging."
Douglas E. Beloof, ConstitutionalImplications of Crime Victims as Participants,88 CORNELL L. REV. 282, 284 (2003). Clearly citizens have a judicially cognizable interest where
their right to approach the grand jury to seek a charge is denied. Citizens have never had a
judicially cognizable interest in compelling the public prosecutor to charge. Thus, it was
not the rise of the public prosecutor that denied the citizen's ability to compel the public
prosecutor to charge, because such compulsion had not been permitted at common law.
However, my thesis in that article, "the modem states' statutory and constitutional inclusion of the victim in the process sets the stage for federal constitutional accommodation of
state crime victims as participants in state criminal processes," remains viable; Linda R.S.
is simply irrelevant to it. Id. at 297. Before I wrote that article, Professor Goldstein interpreted the Linda R.S. dictum to be an historical error that "confused the [nolle prosequi]
power to intervene and dismiss ... with the exclusive power to decide whether they should
be initiated at all." Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal
Prosecution,52 MISS. L.J. 515, 549-50 (1982). His view is off the mark. Instead, citizens
could never compel charging, but rather, had to resort to their own initiatives before the
grand jury. Linda R.S. was historically correct.
50. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619.
51. Id.
52. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 39, 42 (1971).
53. Bailey v. Patterson, 364 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962) (per curiam).
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state criminal statutes because plaintiffs were neither prosecuted nor
threatened with prosecution. 54 While Poe involved a civil challenge to a
criminal statute, rather than a challenge to a prosecution, prosecutorial
discretion remains centrally relevant to the decision.55 In Poe, where the
prosecution exercised its already existing discretion not to seek a charge,
plaintiff had no standing to challenge the criminal statute. 56
The procedural context, internal citations, and the reality of citizens'
judicially cognizable interests in grand jury charging in Texas all support
the interpretation that the Linda R.S. language means that where prosecutors already exercise lawful discretion, citizens lack an interest in prosecution or nonprosecution of another that is sufficient to trump that discretion.57 Thus, Linda R.S. did not establish any new area of public
prosecutorial discretion, it preserved pre-existing discretion.
Unaddressed by Linda R.S. was how citizens' participation rights would
fare where prosecutorial discretion did not previously exist. Would the
Supreme Court use the rise of public prosecution to limit citizens' participation rights?
54. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501,507-09 (1961).
55. See id. at 498, 501.
56. See id. at 501-02.
57. A review of state court opinions citing the Linda R.S. dictum reveal that some
opinions properly use the dictum in the context where prosecutors exercise discretion.
Gansz v. People, 888 P.2d 256, 257-59 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (holding that absent modern
victim law, victims had no standing to seek review of failure to provide victims notice of
allocution at dismissal hearing); Kelly v Dearington, 583 A.2d 937, 940-41 (Conn. App. Ct.
1990) (finding that a citizen has no standing to obtain review of a prosecutor's refusal to
seek arrest warrant); Bradford v. Knights, 695 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Mass. 1998) (holding
that judges may rehear denials of applications for criminal complaints by the clerk of court,
but that individual applicants cannot compel such review); Tarabolski v. Williams, 642
N.E.2d 574, 575 (Mass. 1994) (finding that private citizens have no right to demand a
criminal complaint be issued); Taylor v. Newton Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't., 622 N.E.2d
261, 261-62 (Mass. 1993) (determining that individuals cannot compel a judge to issue
criminal complaints); Shepard v. Attorney General, 567 N.E.2d 187, 189-91 (Mass. 1991)
(declining a request for mandamus to compel Attorney General to take an inquest report
to a grand jury); Manning v. Mun. Court of Roxbury Dist., 361 N.E.2d 1274, 1276 (Mass.
1977) (using Linda R.S. dictum to deny citizen review of trial court's determination that no
probable cause existed); People v. Herrick, 550 N.W.2d 541, 543-44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
(per curiam) (finding the process allowing citizens to seek arrest warrants does not grant
the right to have charges filed); State v. Martineau, 808 A.2d 51, 54 (N.H. 2002) (Nadeau,
J., concurring) (reasoning that there should be no private criminal prosecution without a
prosecuting attorney's approval); Commonwealth v. Malloy, 450 A.2d 689, 693-94 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1982) (citing to Linda R.S. dictum). Some dissenting opinions make the error of
applying the case in a context where prosecutors have no discretion. See In re Wood, 482
A.2d 1033, 1037 (Pa. Super Ct. 1984) (Del Sole, J., dissenting) (erroneously applying
Linda R.S. to justify denial of appeal from trial court decision that a modem victims' rights
statute grants such appeal rights); see also Commonwealth v. Benz, 565 A.2d 764, 770 (Pa.
1989) (Papadakos, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Muroski, 506 A.2d 1312, 1323-24 (Pa.
Super Ct. 1986) (Cirillo, J., dissenting).
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2. Leeke v. Timmerman
Unlike Linda R.S., the Timmerman opinion exemplifies judicial use of
the rise of public prosecution to limit citizens' independent access to a
state criminal court to seek an arrest warrant. In Timmerman, the Supreme Court referenced the Linda R.S. dictum in denying a group of
South Carolina citizens access to state arrest warrants independent of the
public prosecutor.58 Notably, the plain language of the state statute provides no role for public prosecutors in citizens' access to arrest warrants.59
In Timmerman, citizens alleged that they had been beaten by state officials. 60 Based on this allegation they sought arrest warrants from a state
judge. 6' The officials targeted by these citizens contacted the public
prosecutor and asked the prosecutor to participate by contacting the
judge. The public prosecutor contacted the judge, asked him not to issue arrest warrants, and pledged an investigation. 6' The judge did not
issue the warrants, and no investigation took place. 64 The citizens then
brought a federal civil rights action against the state officials alleging interference with access to state courts. 65
The Supreme Court in Timmerman held that the South Carolina statute had not been violated because the state trial court actually did receive
the citizens' documents. 6 As to the interference by state prosecutors, the
Court held that citizens had no standing to object because, citing the
cognizable interest
Linda R.S. language, the citizens had "[no] judicially
67
in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another."
At first blush, it appeared that the Court was saying that state prosecutors' discretion existed because citizens had "[no] judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another." Instead of a
lack of judicial cognizance where government discretion already exists, as
was meant by Linda R.S., Timmerman appeared to make the novel assertion that as a matter of law in all criminal process contexts citizens had no
judicially cognizable interests at all. Such an interpretation would turn
Linda R.S. on its head. However, a close reading of Timmerman reveals
that the opinion's use of the Linda R.S. language was based on the
Court's initial determination that the public prosecutor already had the
discretion to review the warrant application.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 84-87 (1981).
See id. at 87 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3-710 (1976)).
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 86 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)).
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The Court's determination that public prosecutorial discretion to interfere was preexistent is based not on the language of the state statute or
historical tradition, but instead on the prevalence of public prosecution.
When faced with a federal constitutional cause of action arising from an
allegedly unconstitutional state law, federal courts are put in the position
of interpreting state law.6 In interpreting
state
law, federal courts look to
....
69
analogous cases from the state jurisdiction. The Timmerman Court relied upon an 1871 South Carolina Supreme Court opinion, State v. Addison, which held that a citizen/complainant could not move for a change of
venue, and that only the public prosecutor could so move.70 The period
of the late 1800s involved the transition from private to public prosecution.71 When citizens ceased to be interested parties, courts were faced
with questions about what procedures citizens could continue to participate in. 72 While the Addison court noted that "[i]t is difficult to determine in what sense the words 'some party interested' are used in the Act"
governing venue, the court ultimately decided that motions for change of
venue were permissible only in the discretion of public prosecutors, not
citizens.73 In Timmerman, the Supreme Court mimicked the South Carolina court's reliance on public prosecution to determine that public
prosecutorial authority was also dominant in the context of citizens' access to courts to request arrest warrants.74
The applicability of Addison to the Timmerman issue is dubious. Addison involved the meaning of the word "party" and whether the victim was
a party who could move for venue change. At a time when public prosecutors were replacing victims as the party prosecutor, the Addison court
reasonably determined that a victim was not a party.75 On the other
hand, Timmerman took a statute specifically designed for independent
citizen access to courts and interpreted public prosecutorial interference
into it.

68. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 1.5-1.6
(6th ed. 2000).
69. E.g., Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., 55 F.3d 377, 379-80 (8th Cir. 1995); see also
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 68, §§ 1.5-1.6.

70. Timmerman, 454 U.S. at 87 n.2 (citing State v. Addison, 2 S.C. 356, 364 (1871)).
71. See Beloof & Cassell, supra note 7, at 494.
72. Id. at 483-503 (discussing the transition of victims from parties to witnesses in the
context of victim sequestration).
73. Addison, 2 S.C. at 363-64.
74. Timmerman, 454 U.S. at 86-87.
75. Addison, 2 S.C. at 363-64. For an in depth example of how victims' status has
changed over time, see Beloof & Cassell, supra note 7 (examining the historical changes to
victim attendance at trial in light of their loss of party status and the reascendance of victims' attendance in light of their modern status as participants).
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The Timmerman Court cited to ABA standards promulgated by public
prosecutors." Unsurprisingly, the public prosecutor standards urged that
citizen requests for warrants should not be independent of public prosecutors:
This conclusion comports with the smooth functioning of the
criminal justice system. The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, the Prosecution Function 3-3.4 (2d ed.
1980), propose that where the law permits a private citizen to
complain directly to a judicial officer, the complainant 'should be
required to present the complaint for prior approval by the
prosecutor, and the prosecutor's actions or recommendation
thereon should be communicated to the judicial officer .... 7
Finally, the Timmerman Court looked to statutes from other states
that, unlike the South Carolina statute at issue, expressly provided for
public prosecutorial review of arrest warrants. In making its decision, the
Court reasoned that "[m]any jurisdictions contain provisions for private
citizens to initiate the criminal process, and some have required or encouraged 78input of the prosecuting attorney before issuance of an arrest
warrant. ,
The substance of all three authorities relied upon in Timmerman is the
same-the rise of public prosecution. From the perspective of the times,
Timmerman was at least an understandable, though analytically flawed,
decision because the trend was toward exclusive public prosecutorial authority. Within this trend, the Timmerman Court relied upon the dominance of public prosecution (in its various manifestations) as the rationale
to restrict citizens' statutory right to independent access to South Carolina criminal courts to obtain arrest warrants.
II. MODERN VICTIMS' RIGHTS EVIDENCE THE RETURN
TO VICTIMS' INTERESTS

As background for Part III, this Part overviews state sovereignty over
state criminal procedure and modern victims' rights, and identifies that
victims' interests arise from criminal harm and are interests in justice and
avoiding secondary harm from criminal processes.
Federalism principles recognize state court sovereignty over state
criminal processes. Absent powers reserved to the federal government or
barriers within the Federal Bill of Rights, state legislatures and state citizens are free to enact laws on modern victims' rights. The United States
Supreme Court stated: "It goes without saying that preventing and deal76. Timmerman, 454 U.S. at 87 n.3.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing NEB. REV. STAT § 29-404 (1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.10
(1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-2-2 (1979); WIS. STAT. § 968.02(3) (1977)).
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ing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the
Federal Government, and that we should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual
States. ' 9 More specifically, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
legitimacy of states' criminal process accommodations to crime victims.
In Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court found no federal constitutional
violations associated with a victim impact statement given at the sentencing.8° The Payne Court made clear that "the States remain free, in capital
cases, as well as others, to devise new procedures and new remedies to
meet felt needs.""1 Moreover, as Justice William Brennan's views on federalism confirm, "[s]tate experimentation cannot be excoriated simply
because the experiments provide more rather than less protection for
civil liberties ....
In the area of victims' rights, the states have met felt
needs by engaging in experiments providing more, rather than less, protection than found in the Federal Constitution for civil liberties of victims.
Furthermore, modern victims' rights flourish in an era of public prosecution under an express exception to the Linda R.S. language. That exception is the Linda R.S. footnote providing that judicially cognizable
rights can be legislated.83 In the footnote, the Linda R.S. Court acknowledged that Congress could enact rights that would be judicially cognizable: "Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the
statute." 84 By analogy, state legislators can also enact victims' rights accompanied by victim standing.
Since, and to some extent reliant on,8 5 the Linda R.S. footnote, a wave86
of victims' rights laws have swept state and federal criminal processes.
While modem victims' rights laws have not heralded a return to private
felony prosecution at the trial stage, they do provide for participation
independent of the public prosecutor in a variety of procedural contexts. 7
79. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) (citation omitted).
80. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
81. Id. at 824-25.
82. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 550-51 (1986)
(arguing that state rights mirroring federal rights can be interpreted more expansively in
favor of the individual than United States Supreme Court interpretations).
83. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
84. Id.
85. See Goldstein, supra note 49, at 550-52 (observing that victims could be given
legislated standing to participate in restitution proceedings of sentencing hearings).
86. Infra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
87. For example, the victim's right to be heard at sentencing is completely independent of the defendant's constitutional and the state's statutory rights to be heard. See generally Douglas E. Beloof, supra note 49 (evaluating state laws allowing victim allocution at
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These rights are individual rights, personally held by the victim.8 Modern victims' rights are both broad and specific.89 Broad rights "include
the victims' rights to fairness, respect, dignity, privacy, freedom from
abuse, due process, and reasonable protection." 9 Victims' rights provisions typically include the specific rights "to be notified, present and
heard" at critical stages of the criminal process; 9' to speak at pretrial release, plea, sentencing and parole hearings; 92 to confer with the public
prosecutor;93 to a prompt disposition (also known as victims' speedy trial
right); 94 and to attend the trial. Rights are typically enforceable on review by the use of writs.96 Voiding of pleas and sentences can sometimes
be a remedy for rights violations. 97
Victims' interest in justice is a basis of modern victims' rights. In 2004,
the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) was enacted, providing enforceable federal victims' rights laws. 98 The CVRA followed on the heels of
thirty-one state constitutional amendments granting victims' rights in the
criminal process.99
The federal and state victims' rights laws legitimize crime victim harm
upon which victims' interests in justice and minimizing secondary victimization are based. The legislative history provided by the main sponsor of
the CVRA identifies victim harm as the basis for victims' participation
rights, and that victims' interest in justice underlies the rights:

sentencing). As for federal victims' rights, the legislative history to the CVRA right to be
heard makes clear that: "It is not necessary for the victim to obtain the permission of either
party [to address the court]." 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement
of Sen. Kyl); see also Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006) (identifying victims' independent right to speak at sentencing).
88. Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims' Rights: Standing, Remedy
and Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255,272-74.
89. Id. at 262.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 265.
92. Id. at 266; see also Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1016 (upholding victim's federal right to
speak at sentencing).
93. Beloof, supra note 88, at 266.
94. Id. at 267.
95. Id.; see also Beloof & Cassell, supra note 7, at 504-20 (examining victims' right to
attend trial in detail); Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1015-16 (finding "clear congressional intent to
give crime victims the right to [appear personally and] speak at proceedings covered by the
CVRA").
96. Beloof, supra note 88, at 325.
97. See id. at 344-45.
98. See Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila
Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 188 Stat. 2261 (2004) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3771 (Supp. 2004)).
99. Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Model of CriminalProcess: The Victim Participation
Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289 app. A.

1150

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 56:1135

Victims are the persons who are directly harmed by the crime
and they have a stake in the criminal process because of that
harm. Their lives are significantly altered by the crime and they
have to live with the consequences for the rest of their lives. To
deny them the opportunity to know of and be present at proceedings is counter to the fundamental principles of this country. It is
simply wrong.... [T]his bill allows crime victims, in the vast majority of cases, to attend the hearings and trial of the case involving their victimization. This is so important because crime victims
share an interest with the government in seeing that justice is done
in a criminal case and this interest supports the idea that victims
should not be excluded from criminal proceedings, whether these
are pretrial,trial or post-trialproceedings.'I°
Another victims' interest underlying victims' rights is minimizing secondary harm from the criminal process. Again, the CVRA legislative
history is clarifying. With regard to rights of "fairness and respect for the
victims dignity and privacy," the legislative history provides: "too often
victims of crime experience a secondary victimization at the hands of the
criminal justice system."'0 ' The fairness and respect provisions are "intended to direct government agencies and employees, whether they are in
executive or judicial branches, to treat victims of crime with the respect
they deserve and to afford them due process." 1°2 Thirty-three states and
the federal government articulate one or more of the values of respect
for, fairness to, and acknowledgment of, the dignity of the crime victim in
state constitutions or statutes. 13 According dignity, fairness, and respect
to victims by providing them, but not other classes of individuals, with
rights, reveals the importance of victim harm. "These [primary and secondary] harms place the concepts of 'dignity,' 'fairness,' and 'respect' in
context, and provide the fundamental basis for victim participation in the
criminal process."' 4
A focus on more particular rights also reveals victims' interests in
minimizing secondary harm. Like victim laws in many states, federal victims' rights laws provide notice to the victim of escape or release, as well
as 'speedy trial' rights.1 " Avoiding secondary harm is a basis of these
rights. The CVRA legislative history concerning notice provides that
"victim safety requires that notice of the release or escape of an accused
100. 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis
added).
101. Id. at S10,911.
102. Id.
103. Beloof, supra note 99 app. A (setting forth state victims' rights laws expressly
incorporating the concepts of fairness, respect, and dignity).
104. Id. at 294.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2), (7) (Supp. 2004).
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from custody be made in a timely manner to allow the victim to make
informed choices about his or her own safety."1°6 The importance of
avoiding secondary harm is also revealed in the CVRA legislative history
concerning the right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay:
"Whatever peace of mind a victim might achieve after a crime is too often inexcusably
postponed by unreasonable delays in the criminal
17
case." 0
In sum, the criminal harm to the victim gives rise to the both victim's
interests in justice and in minimizing the secondary harm inflicted upon
victims by criminal processes.
III. CRIME VICTIMS' INTERESTS WITHIN JUDICIALLY
CRAFTED PROCEDURES

This Part is divided into five sections. The modern recognition of victims' interests in recent Supreme Court opinions is examined in Section
A. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has identified victims' interests as important considerations in the administration of justice. Section B sets out judicially crafted procedures designed to routinely capture
victims' interests. The example selected for explication is a judicially
created procedure to obtain victims' views concerning a government motion to dismiss an indictment. In Section C, victims' interests as rationales for ending abatement ab initio are analyzed. The trend is to end the
doctrine of abatement ab initio because of victims' interests or the victims' rights to either restitution or fairness and respect. Section D investigates a modem Wisconsin case that reviews an historic procedure allowing victims' access to charging. That case upholds the historic procedure
against a constitutional challenge. The concurring opinions identify
modern victims' rights and victims' interests underlying those rights as
relevant to the ongoing viability of the historic procedure. Finally, Section E analyzes victims' position on impaneling a foreign jury versus
change of venue. In particular, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied
upon victims' more general rights and interests to affirm the trial court's
alternate decision to empanel a foreign jury absent a victims' right expressly addressing venueja
106. 150 CONG. REc. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
107. Id. at S10,911.
108. Victims' interests in justice and minimizing secondary victimization are relied
upon by courts in at least two contexts. First, is the context of victims as a class. Second, is
the context of a particular individual victim. The distinction can be readily seen in case
law. On the one hand, the general victims' interest in timely disposition of a criminal case
is a rationale to limit the time taken to finalize criminal cases in general. Part III Section A
reviews a Supreme Court opinion that, in substantial part, relies on this rationale to support the need for finality. In the other context, an individual victims' information about,
and views for or against, dismissal of an indictment is relevant to a judicial assessment
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A. The Modern Supreme Court's Acknowledgment of Victims' Interests in
the Administration of CriminalProcedures
Even before the advent of meaningful federal victims' rights under the
CVRA, the modem United States Supreme Court endorsed crime victims' interests. In 1983, in Morris v. Slappy, the Court ruled that a continuance to obtain counsel of choice was properly denied. The Court
urged that "in the administration of justice, courts may not ignore the
concerns of victims."' ' The Sixth Circuit has since cited Slappy for the
proposition that, in the context of continuances, "concerns of finality,
administrative convenience and victims' rights have weighed more heavily
in the balance."'110
In Payne v. Tennessee, decided in 1991, the Court recognized crime victims as unique individual human beings whose particularized harm could
be the subject of victim impact statements."' The majority in Payne affirmed that, "'justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser
also .... we are to keep the balance true., 12 Furthermore, three concurring Justices, Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy, acknowledged the ascendance of crime victims' interests:
Justice Marshall has also explained that '[t]he jurist concerned
with public confidence in, and acceptance of the judicial system
might well consider that, however admirable its resolute adherence to the law as it was, a decision contrary to the public sense
of justice as it is, operates, so far as it is known, to diminish respect for the courts and for law itself.' [T]hat a crime's unanticipated consequences must be deemed "irrelevant' to the sentence
conflicts with a public sense of justice keen enough that
3 it has
movement.1
rights"
"victims'
nationwide
a
in
found voice
Written in 1991, the Justices' concurrence in Payne understates the
public sense of justice today. A review of electoral passage rates of constitutional amendments guaranteeing state victims' rights reveals that it is

whether the dismissal is in the public interest. Explored below, in Section B, are two federal district court opinions and a state court opinion where individual victim's information
and views are involved in the courts' evaluation of the government motion to dismiss an
indictment.
109. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983); see also United States v. Young, 50 M.J.
717, 722 & note 2 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1999) (noting that "a continuance may well have
been devastating to the [rape] victim" and citing Morris v. Slappy for the proposition that a
continuance to allow the defendant to retain counsel of their choice was properly denied
by the trial judge).
110. Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275,280 n.9 (1985) (emphasis added).
111. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) ("[Victim impact evidence] is designed to show instead each victim's 'uniqueness as an individual human being.').
112- Id. at 827 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934)).
113. Id. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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not unusual for them to pass by 70-90%."' Similarly, the initial Senate
version of the CVRA passed with a 96-1 vote in favor." ' The Bill became
H.R. 5197 passing ' with
a 394-14 vote in the House and unanimous con6
sent in the Senate.
In 1998, the Supreme Court acknowledged the interests of victims in
the timely execution of sentence. In Calderon v. Thompson, six years
before the CVRA's passage, the Court observed that to unsettle expectations in the execution of moral judgment "is to inflict a profound injury to
the 'powerful and legitimate interests in punishing the guilty,' an interest
shared by the State and the victims of crime alike.""..7 The Court's language is an express recognition that the state's interest in timely punishment is not exclusive, but is shared by victims. The Sixth Circuit interpreted this language in Calderon to mean that, "[t]he Supreme Court has
instructed that the 'State's interests in finality are compelling' and that
the 'powerful and legitimate interest in punishing the guilty' attaches to
both the state and the victims of crime alike., 1' 8 Because the Court did
not rely on statute, the Court implicitly sees victims' interests as relevant
and that these interests are "profound[ly] injured" when execution of
sentence is significantly delayed. Plainly, minimizing secondary harm to
victims is relevant in judicial procedural choices.
The Court's appreciation of victims' interests in Calderon is in harmony with federally legislated victims' "right to proceedings free from
119
unreasonable delay," as well as the rights to "fairness" and "dignity.
The CVRA legislative history provides: "Whatever peace of mind a victim might achieve after a crime is too often inexcusably postponed by
unreasonable delays in the criminal case." ' 2° The Court and Congress
have arrived at the same conclusion, that crime victims' interests are relevant to criminal procedure choices.
Seen in historical context, the language of Slappy, Payne, and Calderon
reflect conventional court roles. The rise of public prosecution changed
the legal culture -prompting, for example, the Court in Timmerman to
interpret a statute to include prosecutorial review of a citizen's arrest
warrant application even though the statute itself was silent on the point.
114. Beloof, supra note 88, at 341 & n.421 (collecting electoral percentages).
115. Id. at 342.
116. Id.
117. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,421 (1993)) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
118. Alley v. Little, 181 Fed. App'x 509, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion);
see also Reid v. Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 543, 552 (E.D. Va. 2004) (citing Calderon and
noting: "At this point, the state and the victims of crime can expect the moral judgment of
the state to be carried out without delay.").
119. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(7)-(8) (Supp. 2004).
120. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9,2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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Analogously, the Court in Slappy, Payne, and Calderon opined within a
legal culture in which victims' interests have become relevant.
B. Judicially Crafted Proceduresto Ensure Trial Court Consideration
of Individual Victims' Interests
Where individual victims lack standing to bring their individual interests to the attention of the court there is little certainty that their interests
will be considered as part of the judicial resolution of the issue."i Thus,
where victims have standing to enforce a right, courts may be alerted directly to victims' interests by the victim.'23 However, where a victim does
not have standing, but nevertheless has information and views relevant
to, for example, the public interest function of the court, there is a need
for judicially crafted procedures to ensure the routine judicial consideration of victim information and views. The alternative to such procedures
is random ad hoc judicial reference to victims' information and views in
certain, but not other cases.
Absent trial level procedures institutionalizing consideration of victims'
interests, it is difficult to say where the rubber of appellate courts' admonishments to respect victims' interests meets the road of trial court
implementation. The admonitions by appellate courts instructing lower
courts to consider the general interests of victims, like the U.S. Supreme
Court's in Slappy, Payne, and Calderon, are more likely to be followed if
lower courts utilize them as a basis for craftingS123trial level procedures that
ensure routine consideration of victim's interests.
Absent such procedures, ensuring that the relevant interests of victims are consistently
brought to the attention of the courts is problematic because there is no
reliable advocate of general victims' interests consistently before the
court.
121. Of course, where victims have standing to enforce their rights, it serves as the
procedural basis for victims' rights violations to be brought to the attention of the court.
However, this Article focuses on judicial consideration of victim interests, whether in or
out of the scope of a particular right.
122. This Article is concerned with judicial weighing of victim interests. It is not an
article about victim standing, a topic I have written about elsewhere. See generally Beloof,
supra note 49, at 275-331. Of course, generally when victims' have state constitutional
rights, or a statutory interest great enough, victims may have standing to enforce their
interests directly. See Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 45 (4th Cir. 1981) (granting interlocutory appeal of pretrial denial of statutory rape shield protection). Courts have victims'
interests directly urged upon them. But no effort is made in this article to parse out what
interests should result in victim standing. Lack of standing is no barrier to communication
when the court seeks victim input.
123. Professor Paul Cassell, also a federal judge, has proposed rules to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See generally Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the
FederalRules of CriminalProcedure:ProposedAmendments in Light of the Crime Victims'
Rights Act, 2005 BYU L. REv. 835 (2005).
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The interests of victims are in justice and avoiding secondary victimization. These interests provide the basis of judicially created procedures to
ensure routine judicial review of victims' interests in specific procedural
contexts.124 For example, in certain procedural stages, courts are responsible for making decisions in the public interest. Victims' interests are
legitimately part of the public interest. In United States v. Biddings, the
district court denied the government's request to dismiss a federal indictment for robbery. In moving the case to trial, the court reasons: "The
manifest public interest, represented by several unrecanting victims, requires a trial to vindicate them or the defendant .... "'z In Biddings, the
trial court considered the individual victims' interests as part and parcel
of the public interest. 6 The Biddings court's recognition of the victims'
interest in justice as an important part of the public interest function of
the court was not based on any statutory victims' right. Thus, Biddings
stands for the proposition that victims' interests are an important component of the public interest assessment of the court in its role in ruling on a
127
government motion to dismiss.
However, Biddings did not establish any ongoing procedure to routinely capture victims' interests in future cases where the government
moves to dismiss. In United States v. Heaton, the federal district court
judge created a procedure that routinely informs the district court of individual victim's information and views.1 8 In Heaton, the government
brought the charge of "using a means of interstate commerce to entice an
129
individual under the age of 18 to engage in unlawful sexual activity.,
Later, the government moved to dismiss the case. The motion to dismiss
was not a public proceeding, as it was submitted in writing."3° Under federal law the victim only has the right to attend public proceedings."'
The court identified its responsibility in dismissal motions under the
federal rules, stating that usually "the court will approve a government
motion to dismiss, as 'a court is generally required to grant a prosecutor's
Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss unless dismissal is clearly contrary to manifest public interest."" 32 The court recognized that even though the judicial standard was "deferential" to the government, "the court must make
124. Facilitating, but not essential to, routine judicial consideration of these interests
are the broad rights to "fairness," "respect," "due process," and "freedom from abuse,"
that are expressly due to victims under law either as rights or as enabling language to
rights. Douglas E. Beloof, supra note 99 app. A.
125. United States v. Biddings, 416 F. Supp. 673, 675 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. United States v. Heaton, 488 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1272-73 (D. Utah 2006).
129. Id. at 1271.
130. See id. at 1271-73.
131. See id. at 1272.
132 Id. at 1271.
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its own independent determination that dismissal is warranted.', 3 3 The
court also acknowledged that the victim had a statutory right under the
CVRA to "confer with the attorney for the Government in the case. 1 34
Like Biddings, the Heaton case includes victims' interests in the public
interest assessment function of the court. Unlike Biddings, Heaton created a judicially crafted procedure to routinely review victims' interests.
The Heaton court viewed as relevant the victims' statutory right under
the CVRA to be treated with "fairness" and "dignity."'3 5 The Heaton
court held:
It is hard to begin to understand how a victim would be treated
with fairness if the court acted precipitously to approve dismissal
of a case without even troubling to consider the victims'
views ....

Likewise, to grant the motion without knowing what

the victim thought would be a plain affront to the victim's dignity.

The district court in Heaton crafted a procedure for future government
motions to dismiss: "in passing on any government motion under Rule
48(a) in any victim related case, the court will expect to see the prosecutor recount that the victim has been consulted on the dismissal and what
'
the victim's views were on the matter."137
Through this judicially crafted
procedure, the court will be routinely informed about individual victims'
views on government motions to dismiss. As result, the courts' public
interest assessment is more fully informed.
Compare the approach in Biddings and Heaton to the Colorado opinion in Gansz v. People. 38 The victim had not been notified of the dismissal motion or hearing, but upon learning of the dismissal, the victim
wrote a letter to the judge, whereupon the judge vacated the dismissal
and ordered a hearing.3 9 The trial court dismissed the case at the hearing.' 4 The Colorado intermediate court denied the victim relief because
he lacked standing to formally object to a dismissal of the case.' 4' The
court opined that there was no violation of the state constitution because
the law did not specifically give victims a right to notice and to be heard
at dismissal proceedings.' 42 While technically correct, the Gansz case
never addressed whether a victims' information and views concerning
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1273.
135. Id. at 1272.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1273.
138. 888 P.2d 256 (Colo. 1995).

139. Id.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 258-59.
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dismissal is an important component of the judicial assessment of the
public interest. This, despite the fact that the Colorado rule governing
143
dismissals is, in pertinent part, similar to the federal rule.
In contrast,
Biddings and Heaton acknowledged that the public interest function includes victims' interests.' 4 Even before the CVRA, the Biddings court
obtained victim information relevant to the court's public interest function. Under the CVRA, Heaton interpreted victims' rights to require consideration of victim information
and views and formulated a procedure to
145
routinely obtain these views.

At least in the context of judicial decisions in the public interest, in an
era of victims' rights and interests, victim input is relevant, and, arguably,
essential to a comprehensive assessment of what is in the public interest.
The judicially crafted procedure in Heaton is portable to other proceedings where courts ought to routinely secure input from the individual
victim, even in the absence of relevant victims' rights.' 46
A second example of such judicially crafted procedure can be found in
the Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Casey. 47 In Utah, victims have
the right to address the court at the time of the plea.
In Casey, the vic
tim came to the plea hearing and wished to speak in opposition to the
plea. 49 The prosecutor was aware of this, yet never informed the trial
court of the victim's objection to the plea bargain 5 The judge accepted
the plea.'

143. Compare COLO. R. GRIM. P. 48(a) ("No criminal case pending in any court shall
be dismissed or a nolle prosequi therein entered by any prosecuting attorney or his deputy,
unless upon a motion in open court, and with the court's consent and approval. Such a
motion shall be supported or accompanied by a written statement concisely stating the
reasons for the action. The statement shall be filed with the record of the particular case
and be open to public inspection. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without
the defendant's consent."), with FED. R. OF GRIM. P. 48 (a) ("The government may, with
leave of court, dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint. The government may not
dismiss the prosecution during trial without the defendant's consent.").
144. See United States v. Heaton, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1273 (D. Utah 2006) ("[T]o
dismiss charges involving a specific victim, the court must have the victim's views on the
motion."); United States v. Biddings, 416 F. Supp. 673, 675 (N.D. Ill. 1976) ("The manifest
public interest, represented by several unrecanting victims, requires a trial to vindicate
them.").
145. Heaton, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.
146. The information may come either through the prosecutor or by routinely soliciting
the amicus curiae participation of the victim, in writing or in person. Victim standing is
obviously not a prerequisite to communicating with a court when the court itself seeks the
victims' input.
147. 44 P.3d 756 (Utah 2003).
148. Id. at 761 n.5.
149. Id. at 757-58, 765.
150. Id. at 758, 765.
151. Id. at 758.
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The victim challenged the plea on review as a misplea, based, in part,
on the prosecutor's failure to advise the court, 52 but "neither the constitution nor the code mandate[d] how [the victim's] request must be sub'
mitted."153
Nevertheless, the court in Casey opined that "the prosecutor
breached his duty as an officer of the court because he failed to bring
relevant information to the court's attention." ' The court continued:
[f]ully aware of [the victim's] desire to speak at defendant's
change of plea hearing, the prosecutor did not inform the court
that [the victim] had invoked his constitutional and statutory
right to be heard. We therefore conclude that [the victim] properly submitted his request to be heard at defendant's change of
plea hearing to the prosecutor. 55
In Casey, the Utah Supreme Court crafted a procedure to ensure that a
victim who wished to be heard could who communicate that to the prosecutor and would have that request forwarded to the judge. This procedure was crafted to facilitate the exercise of rights despite the absence of
an express constitutional or statutory directive.
C. Victims' Interests as the End of Abatement ab Initio
Examined here is the trend in state supreme courts towards elimination
of abatement ab initio because of victims' rights and interests. Abatement occurs when a defendant is convicted at the trial court level, but
dies before appeals of the conviction are finalized. Abatement ab initio
allows a defendant to stand as if he had never been convicted of a
crime."' The rationales for abatement ab initio are aptly summarized in
an opinion of the South Dakota Supreme Court:
The reasoning behind the [majority] rule [of abatement ab initio]
varies among jurisdictions ascribing to it. Generally, the following rationale are offered in support of a court's decision to abate
the criminal proceedings ab initio upon the death of the defendant pending appeal: 1) an appeal is an integral part of the system
for adjudicating guilt or innocence, and defendants who die before appellate review is completed have not obtained final adjudication; 2) appeals of right are granted by statutory and constitutional law and while there is no constitutional right to appeal a
152. Id.
153. Id. at 763.
154. Id. at 765.
155. Id.
156. United States v. Schumann, 861 F.2d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 1988); see also, People
v. Peters, 537 N.W.2d 160, 163 (Mich. 1995) ("In literal application, abatement ab initio
erases a criminal conviction from the beginning on the theory that all injuries resulting
from the crime 'are buried with the offender."' (quoting United States v. Oberlin, 718 F.2d
894, 896 (9th Cir. 1983)).
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criminal conviction, once the right is conferred by statute, it may
not be indiscriminately denied; and 3) penal system principles of
protection of the public and reformation are no longer applicable
57
as the interests of the state and society have been satisfied.
For crime victims, validation that they were wronged comes from the
conviction and sentencing of the criminal defendant. Furthermore, some
financial redress for the wrong may come in the form of restitution.
Abatement ab initio eliminates both the conviction and the opportunity
for restitution. Thus, abatement ab initio denies the importance of victim
vindication and removes from victims the opportunity for financial compensation." In the language of victims' interests, with abatement ab initio victims are denied justice and a secondary harm is inflicted upon
them.
Modern victims' rights statutes do not expressly address abatement.
Nevertheless, in ruling on the continuing viability of abatement ab initio,
courts could take one of several approaches. First, a court could decline
to alter its rule because victims' rights do not specifically address abatement. Second, a court could recognize the relevance of victims' rights
and interests in general as a basis to eliminate abatement ab initio. Third,
a court could determine that a victim's specific right to restitution outweighed the previously prevailing policies underlying abatement rights.
A fourth option is to rely on both the general relevance of both victims'
rights and a specific right to eliminate abatement ab initio. Increasingly,
courts are relying on either the second, third or fourth approach to eliminate abatement ab initio.
The Illinois intermediate appellate court ended abatement ab initio.
Then, in an opinion unique among recent abatement ab initio cases, the
Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The Illinois intermediate court of appeals "held that it would not abate defendants' convictions because
abatement would have a 'senselessly harsh impact on the psychological
well being' of crime victims and their families by implying that defendants had somehow been exonerated."' 59 The intermediate appellate
court noted that abatement "emanate[s] from the view that criminal
prosecutions should punish the guilty and protect society from any future
157. State v. Hoxsie, 570 N.W.2d 379, 380 (S.D. 1997) (collecting cases). Two minority
rules hold that (1) criminal defendant's death abates the appeal but not the conviction,
noting that "the presumption of innocence falls with the defendant's conviction and to
expunge the judgment of conviction for any reason other than a showing of error would
not benefit either the deceased defendant or the State," id. at 381, and (2) where rules
allow substitution of parties and no party is substituted for defendant the appeal is abated
ab initio, but the conviction stands. Id.
158. It also removes the res judicata function of criminal convictions where the conviction serves to establish liability in tort, thus forcing victims to begin a civil trial against the
convict's estate in order to re-establish liability.
159. People v. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d 662, 663 (I11.1999).
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criminal misdeeds of the defendant 1 6 The court went on to identify that
"this traditional view began to change nationally, however, in the late
1970's and early 1980's with the recognition that crime victims ...

also

161
have important, personal interests at stake in criminal proceedings.,
The court recognized that victims have rights "which are distinct from the
interests of either the defendant or the State."16 2 This opinion clearly
values the victim interest of minimization of secondary harm, manifested
in the language that abatement "would have a senselessly harsh impact

upon the psychological well being of [the victims]."1 63

The Illinois Supreme Court vacated, stating:
The Crime Victim's Rights Amendment provides crime victims
with a set of 10 distinct rights in criminal prosecutions. The State
points specifically to two of these freshly minted constitutional
rights of victims: the right to 'be treated with fairness and respect
for their dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process,' and the right to restitution. Unfortunately for the State's argument, the Crime Victim's Rights Amendment has neither application nor reference to the abatement of criminal prosecutions.
That is to say, it is wholly irrelevant to the issue at hand.
The main difference between these opinions is in their views on the
value of victims' interests in judicially crafted procedures. The Illinois
Supreme Court focused narrowly in looking for abatement language in
specific rights. To the Illinois Supreme Court, neither victims' interests
underlying their rights nor the victims' rights to restitution or fairness
6 and
respect were relevant absent legislation ending abatement ab initio.'
Perceiving a changing legal culture that increasingly incorporates victims' interests, state courts from other jurisdictions have rejected the Illinois Supreme Court's restrictive approach. In State v. Korsen, the Idaho
Supreme Court relied upon the crime victim's right to "be '[t]reated with
160. People v. Robinson, 699 N.E.2d 1086, 1089 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), vacated, 719
N.E.2d 662 (I11.1999).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1090.
164. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d at 663 (citations omitted).
165. Id. at 664. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the law of abatement ab initio
had been case law for twenty years and it would be changed only by specific legislation to
the contrary. Id. at 663-64. Nevertheless, a separation of powers basis to deny victims'
interests seems forced, particularly when abatement ab initio was a judicially created procedure in the first place. Moreover, the twenty years that abatement had been case law
was the same twenty years during which victim interests had been repeatedly acknowledged by the Illinois legislature which enacted a variety of victim's rights. See, e.g., 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/2 (West 2002) (implementing victim's rights protections); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 172/5-10 (West 2002) (establishing a program to protect victims of
gang violence); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-2001 (West 2003) (allowing for civil recovery by crime victims against defendants).
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fairness, respect, dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice
process' as a basis for denying abatement ab initio.'6 The court observed that "abatement of the conviction would deny the victim of the
fairness, respect and dignity guaranteed by these laws by preventing the
finality and closure they are designed to provide.' ' 167 The Idaho court
brought the abatement ab initio issue within the ambit of victims' rights,
although those rights did not expressly address abatement ab initio.
The Idaho court also considered the victims' interests underlying victims' rights in denying abatement ab initio. Victims do not have a right to
restitution in Idaho-it is discretionary-but restitution is ordered unless
it would be "inappropriate or undesirable."' 68 Nevertheless, victims' interests underlying the laws providing for restitution for victims were a
sufficient basis for the court to opine that such laws established "a strong
public policy ground for not abating a criminal conviction." ' 69 The Idaho
court recognized that finality and closure are important victim interests.
The court was protecting victims' interest in justice and avoiding secondary victimization, even though the right to restitution was not mandated.
Restitution, a compensation based in victims' harm from the crime, was
recognized by the court as a "strong public policy ground" upon which to
deny abatement.' 70
In People v. Peters, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that "where
the intent behind a fine or order is to compensate the victim, the fine or
order may survive the death of the offender."'' 7' The court identified that,
"[the Michigan Crime Victim's Rights Act was enacted.., in response to
growing recognition of the concerns of crime victims. The act codifies the
victim's right to restitution . . .. ,
The subsequent constitutional
amendment providing victims' rights "further enumerate the rights of
crime victims"
making clear the "compensatory nature of restitution in
173
Michigan.'
Financially injured by the infliction of victims' primary harm, harm
from the crime itself, Michigan victims' rights to restitution compensate
the victim for this loss. The Michigan court concluded that "[t]he order
of restitution was issued under the authority of the Michigan Constitution
and the Crime Victim's Rights Act [which] were intended to enable victims to be compensated fairly for their suffering at the hands of convicted

166.
167.
16&
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130, 134-35 (Idaho 2005).
Id. at 135.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 135.
Id.
People v. Peters, 537 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Mich. 1995).
Id.
Id. at 164-65.
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offenders.', 7 4 Therefore, the court enforced the order of restitution and
denied abatement ab initio
The Michigan opinion is exclusively based on victims' specific right to
restitution. The opinion itself does not rely on the victims' interests underlying victims' rights other than to explain the restitution right. The
Michigan Supreme Court interprets the scope of victim's right of restituultimately prioritizing the compensation to include the abatement issue,
76
harm.
primary
victim's
the
tion for
The Washington Supreme Court has referenced victims' interests to
end abatement ab initio because it inflicts an unacceptable secondary
harm on crime victims. 1 77 In a case where the victim "declined to seek
restitution and therefore did not suffer financial harm from the abatement, ' the Washington court held that avoiding harm to the victim was
an appropriate basis for denying abatement ab initio. 17 Citing the victims' broad state constitutional right to "dignity and respect" the Washington court opined, "[I]n this case, [the victim] was shocked and distressed when ... [the defendants'] record was wiped clean, and [the victim] fear[ed] renewed violence and strife if the child custody case [was]
reopened. These impacts alone, as described in her declaration make the
abatement rule 'harmful' as applied here."'79
In the absence of express reliance upon either a specific or broad victims' right, the Alabama Supreme Court, in Wheat v. State, denied
abatement ab initio because of crime victims' interests. '8 The court did
not rely on rights to fairness or dignity because Alabama does not provide these rights."' Moreover, restitution was not a factor in the Wheat
opinion. To be sure, the Alabama court referenced the general existence
of victims' state constitutional and statutory rights in order to highlight
the importance of victims' interests. Nevertheless, Wheat is not a scope82
of rights opinion, rather, it is an opinion based on victims' interests.1
174.
175.
176.
victims'

Id. at 165.
Id. at 161-63.
Maryland's highest court has also ended abatement ab initio, in part because of
restitution. Surland v. State, 895 A.2d 1034, 1040, 1044-45 (Md. 2006). Curiously,

in this otherwise comprehensive opinion, the Maryland Court of Appeals is mute about the
Korsen and Wheat recognition that abatement ab initio inflicts an unacceptable secondary
victimization on the crime victim. See Wheat v. State, 907 So.2d 461, 464 (Ala. 2003); State
v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130, 134-35 (Idaho 2005). Since the Maryland opinion, Washington
state has joined the Wheat and Korsen cases in recognizing the unacceptable nature of
secondary harm inflicted by abatement ab initio. State v. Devin, 142 P.3d 599, 605 (Wash.
2006).
177. Devin, 142 P.3d at 605.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 604-05.

180.

Wheat, 907 So.2d at 462-64.

181.
182.

Beloof, supra note 99 app. A.
See Wheat, 907 So.2d. at 463-64.
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After reviewing and rejecting the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion in
People v. Robinson, the Alabama court quoted approvingly from the
overruled intermediate Illinois appellate court opinion. The Alabama
court "recognize[d] what the Illinois intermediate court described as 'the
callous impact [vacating a conviction ab initio] necessarily has on the surviving victims of crime,""' to determine that abatement ab initio would
not be the law in Alabama. The Alabama court recognized that secondary harm, or "callous impact," to the victim was relevant to the procedural decision. The Alabama court implicitly recognized that the modem
legal culture is inclusive of victims' interests and that it is appropriate for
the judiciary to weigh these interests in fashioning criminal procedures.
State court judicial decisions are strongly trending towards including
the abatement ab initio issue either within the scope of victims' rights or,
absent a controlling right, relying on crime victims' interests to evaluate
abatement ab initio's viability. This trend in state supreme courts to end
abatement ab initio by valuing victims' rights and interests may signal a
change in federal abatement case law. In Durham v. United States, a
direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court recognized abatement ab
initio, holding that "death [of the convict] pending direct review of a
criminal conviction abates not only the appeal but also all proceedings
had in the prosecution from its inception." ' 84 Five years later, in Dove v.
1 85
United States, on a petition for certiorari, the court overruled Durham.
Taken together, these cases have been interpreted by the Fifth Circuit to
mean that abatement ab initio is in effect only in cases involving appeal
as a matter of right.' 86
In the intervening years since 1971, the Crime Victims' Rights Act of
2004 (CVRA) has been enacted into federal law.87 The CVRA contains
many provisions similar to the state laws relied upon in state cases that
abandoned abatement ab initio." 8 Moreover, as revealed above in Part
A, the Supreme Court has acknowledged victims' interests as legitimate
even in the absence of particular victims' rights legislation. Given recent
federal legislation concerning victims' rights and the Court's own acknowledgement of victims' interests, the ongoing viability of federal
abatement ab initio is in doubt.

183. Id. at 464 (alteration in original).
184. Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971) (per curiam), overruled by
Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976).
185. Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976) (per curiam).
186. United States v. Pauline, 625 F.2d 684, 685 (5th Cir. 1980).
187. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (Supp. 2004).
188. Compare id., with State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130, 134-35 (Idaho 2005), People v.
Peters, 537 N.W.2d 160, 164, 165 & n.31, 166 (Mich. 1995), and State v. Devin, 142 P.3d
599,605-06 (Wash. 2006).
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D. An Enduring HistoricalChargingProcedurefor Citizens
In a 1989 Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion, the majority upheld the
constitutionality of a statute, dating back to 1839, establishing a procedure for judges to investigate and charge. 89 The statute provided that
citizens could report crimes to a judge, who, in her discretion, could investigate and charge.' 90 In concurring opinions, three justices went beyond the constitutional issue and referred to victims' interests in order to
address the policy question of whether citizens' should have independent
access to charging courts.
The chief justice wrote in concurrence: "The writer is not unmindful of
the predicament of a victim of a crime who is afforded no relief by a recalcitrant prosecutor. It would appear.., that this situation might better
be alleviated by legislative approval of a limited judicial review of a
prosecutor's declination to prosecute."' 9' The chief justice's view is
clearly informed by victims' interest in justice. The chief justice's concern
is for some relief (justice) for the victim, over exclusive prosecutorial control over charging. Moreover, the modern focus on the victims' interest is
apparent in his proposed alternative. The chief justice's alternative focuses on concerns of the victim of crime, rather than the citizen set out in
the historic statute.' 92 His focus is on the victim of crime rather than on
public or community interests.
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Day incorporates the significance of modern victims' rights into an assessment of the continuing viability of the historic statutory citizen participation right: "In this period
when we see interest in 'victim's rights' coming to the fore, certainly having one's tormentor brought to justice should be near the top of any victim's rights program, second only to the right not to be a victim in the
189. State v. Unnamed Defendant, 441 N.W.2d 696, 698, 701 (Wis. 1989).
190. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.26 (West 2007) ("If a person complains to a judge that he
or she has reason to believe that a crime has been committed within his or her jurisdiction,
the judge shall examine the complainant under oath and any witnesses produced by him or
her and may, and at the request of the district attorney shall, subpoena and examine other
witnesses to ascertain whether a crime has been committed and by whom committed. The
extent to which the judge may proceed in the examination is within the judge's discretion.
The examination may be adjourned and may be secret. Any witness examined under this
section may have counsel present at the examination but the counsel shall not be allowed
to examine his or her client, cross-examine other witnesses or argue before the judge. If it
appears probable from the testimony given that a crime has been committed and who
committed it, the complaint may be reduced to writing and signed and verified; and thereupon a warrant shall issue for the arrest of the accused. Subject to s. 971.23, if the proceeding is secret, the record of the proceeding and the testimony taken shall not be open to
inspection by anyone except the district attorney unless it is used by the prosecution at the
preliminary hearing or the trial of the accused and then only to the extent that it is so
used."); Unnamed Defendant, 441 N.W.2d at 696 n.1.
191. Unnamed Defendant,441 N.W.2d at 702 (Heffernan, C.J., concurring).
192. Compare id. at 702, with Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.26 (West 2007).
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first place."' 93 And, later in his opinion, he states "[c]rime victims should
have recourse to the judicial branch when the executive branch fails to
respond." 194 Justice Day relies upon the victim's interest in justice underlying modern victims' rights. For Justice Day, the victim's interest in justice provides support for citizen access to judicial charging that is unfettered by prosecutorial discretion. The victim has an interest in justice
and is harmed secondarily by the government's denial of it.
Finally, Justice Steinmetz's separate concurrence identifies the connection between the historic statute and modem victims' rights: "These statutes... have withstood the test of time, and ... these statutes promoted
victims' rights before that term became popular . . . 9 The Wisconsin

concurrences used modem victims' rights to uphold rather than eliminate
or compromise the historic charging statute. This makes sense because
modern victims' rights generally do not diminish citizens' preexisting
common law participation rights.' 96 Generally, reliance on a specific
modern victims' right to eliminate or reduce enduring citizens' participation rights is misplaced. Such reliance requires ignoring or minimizing
the interests underlying modern victims' rights, interests that are similar
to the interests underlying historic citizen rights of participation.
As of 1999, thirty-three state victims' rights schemes (and, since 2004,
the federal CVRA) contained at least one of the values of or rights to
fairness, respect, dignity, privacy, due process, and freedom from abuse97
Degrading citizens' preexisting participation rights in the name of "fairness" and "respect" for, and the "dignity" of, crime victims makes little
sense. Furthermore, victims' specific rights are individual rights, personal
to victims, that give victims the right to participate independently of the
public prosecutor. 99 Thus, victims' interests underlying modern rights do
not readily lend themselves to an argument for eroding enduring historical citizens' participation rights.' 99

193. Id. at 703 (Day, J., concurring).
194 Id. at 704.
195. Id. at 704 (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
196. Some rights schemes have been clever enough to foreclose such unforeseen legal
land mines. For example, the Arizona Constitution provides that: "The enumeration in
the constitution of certain rights for victims shall not ...deny or disparage others granted
by the legislature or retained by victims." ARIZ. CONST. art. 2. § 2.1(E); see also S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 24. But where such language is missing in other modem victims' rights
schemes, like the Wisconsin scheme, its absence should not lead to the conclusion that
historic citizens' participation rights should, therefore, be restricted.
197. Beloof, supra note 99, app. A; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8) (Supp. 2004).
198. Beloof, supra note 88, 271-74.
199. An exception is that historical participation interests belonged to citizens, while
modem interests are victims' interests. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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E. Victims' Interests in ForeignJury Versus Change of Venue
A further illustration of the relevance of victims' interests in judicially
crafted procedures is found in State v. Timmendequas. There, the New
Jersey Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for change of venue in a homicide case because a change of venue
2
would have added two hours a day to the victim's travel time to trial. 0'
Instead the trial court impaneled a foreign jury. The prosecutor's objection to venue change was based upon the victim's right to be treated with
"fairness [and] compassion," the right "to be present" at trial, and the
right to have inconveniences "minimized."20'
The Timmendequas case relied on victims' interests underlying modem
victims' rights to make judicial procedural decisions even in the absence
of a specific legislated provision mentioning "venue." The defendant
argued that the explicit rights at issue were not relevant to his motion to
change venue. The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned:
Defendant views the Legislature's commitment to victim's rights
too narrowly. Over the past decade, both nationwide and in New
Jersey, a significant amount of legislation has been passed implementing increased levels of protection for victims of crime.
Specifically, in New Jersey, the Legislature enacted the "Crime
Victim's Bill of Rights." That amendment marked the culmination of the Legislature's efforts to increase the participation of
crime victims in the criminal justice system. The purpose of the
Victims' Rights Amendment was to 'enhance and protect the
necessary role of crime victims...

in the criminal justice proc-

ess. 202
Relying on this enabling language, the New Jersey Supreme court acknowledged the relevance of victims' interests in a judicial change of
venue decision and held that the trial court's refusal to change venue was
proper.
IV. TIMMERMAN REVISITED

Timmerman can be viewed in at least two ways, both of which support
the modem relevance of victims' interests in judicially crafted procedures. On the one hand, Timmerman can be viewed as an inappropriate
federal court judicial re-drafting of a state statute. Stated more broadly,
public prosecution alone should not have been a basis for federal judicial
deviation from a state citizens' statutory right. Under this interpretation,
citizens' interests should have been given greater, and public prosecution
interests less, weight. On the other hand, Timmerman could be seen as
200. State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 73-77 (N.J. 1999).
201. Id. at 75-76.
202- Timmendequas, 737 A.2d. at 76 (citations omitted).
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properly weighing public prosecution in an era when it was increasingly
dominant. By analogy, this view supports the modern judicial weighing
of victims' interests in crafting criminal procedures.
The Timmerman opinion is subject to re-visitation in light of modern
victims' interests. Today, Timmerman's deference to public prosecution
is excessive. First, Timmerman relied on the weight the South Carolina
case of Addison gave to public prosecution in denying the victim party
status. 2 3 Today, South Carolina victims' rights are, in all material aspects,
similar to New Jersey's. South Carolina's constitution, like New Jersey's,
provides victims with the right to be treated with "fairness. ''204 South
Carolina's constitution goes further to provide victims with the right to be
treated with "respect" and "dignity., 20 5 While South Carolina does not
have New Jersey's statutory right that inconveniences be "minimized,"
the South Carolina constitution provides that victims be "free from...
abuse throughout the criminal ... justice process . . . . ,20 Finally, South
Carolina has an unqualified right of the victim to be present at any criminal proceedings "which are dispositive of the charges where the defendant has the right to be present." 2°7
The decisional tipping point for a modern South Carolina court facing
the issue and facts like those in Timmendequas, is not whether the specific victims' rights are sufficiently the same as New Jersey's rights, because they are. Rather, the pertinent question is whether the South
Carolina court will view victims' interests and rights as relevant to judicial
procedural choices where the issue at hand, here venue versus foreign
jury, is not specifically mentioned in victims' rights, but nevertheless may
inflict a secondary harm on the victim. The fundamental issue is similar
to the choice faced by the courts in the abatement ab initio cases: are victims' rights and victims' interests, as well as the victim's views, relevant to
a judicial procedural choice?
One judicial option is to look narrowly for victims' rights expressly addressing "venue." Under this logic, because South Carolina has no victims' right expressly mentioning "venue," victims' rights could not sustain
an objection to change of venue, regardless of whether the victim or the
prosecutor made the objection. Such a result would be analogous to the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision regarding abatement ab initio in which
victims' foundational interests were not valued enough to alter the procedure. 28
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 & n.2 (1981).
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(1).
Id.
Id.
Id. at art. I. § 24(A)(3).
See supra Part II.C; see also People v. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d 662, 663 (111. 1999).
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If the South Carolina court follows the New Jersey case to hold that
victims' interests are relevant to whether venue is changed or a foreign
jury impaneled, then it may also be appropriate for the victim to bring
these interests to the court's attention, as the parties may fail to do so.
Perhaps victims' rights and interests allow victims either at the trial
court's invitation or through standing to provide information in opposition to change of venue. To the extent victims may do so, the Addison
case, with it's refusal to allow a victim to participate in a motion for
change of venue, is compromised. This is not to say victims would necessarily have party status. Rather, as victims with important interests at
stake, some accommodation might be made for incorporating their views
or objections into the venue decision. Thus, a modern South Carolina
court might weigh victims' interests in venue, something the Addison
court did not do. If so, the Timmerman Court's reliance on Addison is
now obsolete.
Second, the Timmerman opinion expressly relied on the ABA prosecutor section's negative views of the propriety of allowing citizens' independent access to arrest warrants to deny such access. 209 Given modern
victims' interests, as well as the fact that there is now a Victim Subcommittee of the ABA's Criminal Justice Section, it would be odd if the
Court today deconstructed a specific modem state victims' right because
of an adverse opinion of the prosecutor's section of the ABA. For example, most states grant victims the unfettered right to speak at sentencing.
A few states allow it in the court's discretion. Prosecutors as a whole
might favor this discretionary law because they could argue to the judge
that a victim in a given case shou.:h not be heard. Today, it is unlikely
that any such assertion by the prosecutor's section of the ABA would
cause the Supreme Court to redraft a state's absolute right to speak at
sentencing into a discretionary one.
Finally, the Timmerman opinion relied on statues from other states
which, unlike the South Carolina statute, expressly allowed interference
by the public prosecutor.2 '0 The use of an interpretive technique to
weaken a modem victims' right of one state by referencing distinctly different statutory language in other jurisdictions, as was done by the Supreme Court in Timmerman, is inappropriate. For example, victims have
the unfettered right to attend trial in many jurisdictions. 211 In Utah, however, the prosecutor can interfere with the victims right to attend, as the
state evidence code provides: "This rule does not authorize exclusion of
..

a victim in a criminal... proceeding where the prosecutor agrees with

209.
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Timmerman, 454 U.S. at 87 & n.3.
Id. at 88 n.3.
See generally, Beloof & Cassell, supra note 7, at 504-05.
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the victim's presence ...., In an era of victims' rights, it certainly
would be inappropriate to graft the Utah provision onto state laws whose
plain language gives victims the right to attend without prosecutorial interference. Of course, the right at issue in Timmerman was an historic
citizen right of access to the state court to secure a warrant, not a modern
victims' right.213 However, the historic nature of citizens' rights statutes is
not necessarily a liability to their ongoing viability. Modern victims'
rights also challenge the Timmerman premise that public prosecution is
enough to compromise enduring historic citizens' rights of participation.
The concurring opinions in the Wisconsin case that upheld a historic statute granting citizen access to charging acknowledged, at the very least,
that we are presently in a era of victims' rights in which victims' interests
matter.
Revisiting the United States Supreme Court Timmerman opinion in
light of emerging victims' rights and interests, the opinion is problematic
in the sense that it fails to give sufficient weight to victims' interests.
First, Timmerman relied on the heavy weight Addison gave to the fact of
public prosecution, a weight which should now be balanced by the reality
of modern victims' rights and interests. Second, the Timmerman opinion
expressly relied on the ABA prosecutor section's negative views of the
propriety of allowing citizens' independent access to arrest warrants to
deny such access. The weight of prosecutors' views now are balanced
against victims' interests and views. Third, in weighing victim rights and
interests into the balance, mandatory victims' right should not be undercut because a neighbor state made the right discretionary. Finally,
Timmerman's analytical approach is also weakened by the Supreme
Court's recognition since that opinion of victims' interests, set out in Part
III.A., above. For the modem court, "in the administration
of criminal
21 4
victims.
of
concerns
the
ignore
not
may
courts
justice,
For all these reasons, Timmerman is undermined. Moreover, the
Timmerman case is not the only one rendered questionable by the rise of
victims' rights and interests. For example, the Supreme Court's abatement ab initio doctrine is also ripe for reconsideration because judicially
crafted procedures should now weigh victims' interests and rights in the
balance.
V. CONCLUSION

In this era of victims' rights expansion, thirty-three state constitutions
embody victims' rights, statutory victims' rights exist in every state jurisdiction, and there is a vigorous new federal statutory victims' rights law.
212.
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UTAH R. EVID. 615(1)(d).
Timmerman, 454 U.S. at 85-86.
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983).
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The CVRA legislative history provides: "A central reason for these rights
is to force a change in a criminal justice culture which has failed to focus
on the legitimate interests of crime victims ....""' Victims' interests in
justice and minimizing secondary harm from government actors and
criminal processes are of greater relevance than the sum of victims' individual rights. Increasingly, victims' interests, as well as victims' rights
themselves, are important considerations in judicially determined procedural choices.
The increasing relevance of victims' interests has important implications for: the judicial interpretation of historic citizen participation rights;
courts' views of prosecutorial authority in relation to victims' interests,
for example, victims' participation in change of venue proceedings; and,
procedures formulated in an era without any regard for victims' interests,
such as abatement ab initio.
The legislatively led historic shift to public prosecution was facilitated
by courts. Given the legislatively led historic shift to include victims'
rights and interests, courts should continue to weigh victims' interests and
rights when crafting criminal procedure.
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150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).

